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Robert W. Kerr* Constitutional Umitations on
the Admiralty Jurisdiction of
the Federal Court
I. Introduction
The constitutionality of the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal
Court of Canada has been in dispute in six recent Federal Court
cases' on the basis of Supreme Court of Canada rulings 2 that actual
federal law, and not merely federal legislative authority, is
necessary to constitutionally support the creation of a federal court
under s. 101 of the British North America Act. 3 Although it does not
yet appear to have been argued before the courts in a reported case,
an even more serious potential challenge to this admiralty
jurisdiction lies in another Supreme Court decision4 implying that
federal power to regulate the property and civil rights of shipping
does not extend to intraprovincial shipping. It seems appropriate,
therefore, to review the constitutional status of the Federal Court's
admiralty jurisdiction.
II. The Origin of Federal Admiralty Power
The historical origin of federal legislation conferring admiralty
jurisdiction on a federally-created court is constitutionally unique. It
did not flow from the British North America Act, as other Canadian
legislative authority did, but rather from the Colonial Courts of
Admiralty Act, 1890.5
*Professor of Law, University of Windsor
1. The Queen v. Canadian Vickers Ltd. (1977), 77 D.L.R. (3d) 241 (Fed. Ct.);
Sivaco Wire and Nail Co. v. Atlantic Lines and Navigation Co., Inc. (1977), 78
D.L.R. (3d) 529 (Fed. Ct.); Intermunicipal Realty and Development Corporation
v. Gore Mutual Insurance Company (1977), unreported (Fed. Ct.); Associated
Metals & Minerals Corporation v. Ship "Evie W" (1977), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 538; 20
N.R. 50 (Fed. C.A.); Santa Marina Shipping Co. S. A. v. Lunham & Moore Ltd.
(1978), 85 D.L.R. (3d) 398 (Fed. Ct.); Benson Bros. Shipbuilding Co. (1960) Ltd.
v. Mark Fishing Co. Ltd. (1978), 21 N.R. 260 (Fed. C.A.)
2. Quebec North Shore Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R.
1054; 71 D.L.R. (3d) 111; 9 N.R. 471; McNamara Construction (Western) Ltd. v.
The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 654; 75 D.L.R. (3d) 273; 13 N.R. 181
3. 30 & 31 Victoria (U.K.), c. 3, as amended. Subsequent citations of this Act will
refer simply to the B.N.A. Act.
4. Agence Maritime Inc. v. Conteil Canadien des Relations Ouvrikres, [1969]
S.C.R. 851; 12 D.L.R. (3d) 722
5. 53 & 54 Victoria (U.K.), c. 27. In the light of subsequent interpretation of the
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On the basis of this authority, Parliament adopted The Admiralty
Act, 1891.6 This Act conferred admiralty jurisdiction on the federal
Exchequer Court and made some provision for the organization of
the court in exercising this jurisdiction. The jurisdiction conferred
Canadian constitution, it could be argued that even the Colonial Court of Admiralty
Act, 1890, did not confer on the Canadian Parliament the power it purported to
exercise by designating the federal Exchequer Court a court with full admiralty
jurisdiction. Parliament exercised this power through The Admiralty Act, 1891,
S.C. 1891, c. 29. In a preamble, Parliament cited the Colonial Courts of Admiralty
Act, 1890; the Interpretation Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Victoria (U.K.), c. 63; and the
British North America Act as the bases of its authority. Under the B.N.A. Act, as
will be subsequently discussed in the text, legislative power over admiralty matters
may be an area of divided power. In that event, Parliament by the B.N.A. Act
could only confer admiralty jurisdiction on a federal court over those parts of
admiralty law that were within federal legislative authority. Moreover, based on the
Quebec North Shore Paper and McNamara Construction cases, supra, note 2,
there might have had to be an established body of federal admiralty law to justify
conferring jurisdiction on a federal court. No such body of law was established
until after the Exchequer Court assumed this jurisdiction.
Section 3 of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, conferred power to
establish courts of admiralty upon "the legislature of a British possession".
Section 18(7) of the Interpretation Act, 1889 (U.K.), provided that "the expression
'legislature', when used with reference to a British possession, shall . . . mean the
authority, other than the Imperial Parliament or Her Majesty the Queen in Council,
competent to make laws for a British possession". This could mean either the
federal Parliament or a provincial legislature, depending on the division of power
under the B.N.A. Act.
Since there are several references to "Colonial law" in the Colonial Courts of
Admiralty Act, 1890, the federal Praliament may have been relying in part of the
definition of "colony" in section 18(3) of the Interpretation Act, 1889 (U.K.),
which stated "where parts of such dominions are under both a central and a local
legislature, all parts under the central legislature shall, for the purposes of this
definition, be deemed to be one colony". However, it seems unlikely that this
definition was intended or would be allowed to have the effect of abrogating the
division of powers in a federal colony. It seems more likely that the type of
approach used in Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario
(Labour Conventions), [1937] A.C. 326; [1937] 1 D.L.R. 673; [1937] 1 W.W.R.
299 (P.C.) would be followed, and any power devolving on the colony would be
distributed in accordnace with the division of powers within the colony. Section 15
of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act itself defines "Colonial law" in the same
terms as "legislature" is defined in the Interpretation Act, 1889 (U.K.), which, as
already noted, could refer to laws for either the federal Parliament or a provincial
legislature.
As will subsequently be discussed in the text, to the extent that Parliament did
acquire any additional power under the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, it
was probably able to repeal that Act to the same extent. Thus, after Parliament
under The Admiralty Act, S.C. 1934, c. 31, s. 35, purported to repeal the Colonial
Courts of Admiralty Act, 1891 in so far as it applied to Canada, the authority of
Parliament to establish admiralty courts rested solely on the B.N.A. Act. The
question of whether it ever had any greater power is now largely moot.
6. S.C. 1891, c. 29
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was defined by reference to "the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High
Court in England, whether existing by virtue of any statute or
otherwise". 7 There were no provisions as to substantive rights in
either the United Kingdom or the Canadian statute, although the
Canadian Act did refer to substantive rights by stating that "all
persons shall . . . have all rights and remedies in all matters
(including cases of contract and tort and proceedings in rem and in
personam), arising out of or connected with navigation, shipping,
trade or commerce, which may be had or enforced" within the
jurisdiction of the court.
8
There was in existence in 1891 a considerable volume of federal
statutory law relevant to shipping, 9 however, this legislation was
not a comprehensive code. To a considerable extent, the law of
admiralty consisted of common law, as distinct from statute law.
Following the passage of the Statute of Westminister, 1931,10
Parliament passed a new Admiralty Act, 1934.11 This statute
continued the role of the federal Exchequer Court as a Court of
Admiralty and redefined its jurisdiction somewhat. The admiralty
jurisdiction was "to extend to and be exercised in respect of all
navigable waters, tidal and non-tidal, whether naturally navigable
or artificially made so . . . and, generally, such jurisdiction shall,
subject to the provisions of this Act, be over the like places,
persons, matters and things as the Admiralty jurisdiction now
possessed by the High Court of Justice in England, whether existing
by virtue of any statute or otherwise, and be exercised by the Court
in like manner and to as full an extent as by such High Court". 12
The 1934 Act proceeded to specify some of the types of dispute
that fell under the Exchequer Court's admiralty jurisdiction, unlike
the 1891 Act which had described the Court's jurisdiction only in
broad general Terms. On the other hand, no provision in the 1934 Act
purported to confer any substantive rights, in contrast to the terse,
but broad, provision of the 1891 Act conferring "all rights and
remedies in all matters" within the Court's jurisdiction.
In exercise of powers conferred upon Canadian legislatures by the
Statute of Westminister, 1931,13 the 1934 Act provided for the
7. Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, supra, note 5, s.2(2 )
8. The Admiralty Act, 1891, supra, note 6, s.4
9. See R.S.C. 1886, cc. 70-88
10. 22 George V (U.K.), c.4
11. S.C. 1934, c. 3 1
12. Id. s.18(1)
13. Supra, note 10, ss.2 and 6
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repeal of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, in so far as it
was part of the law of Canada. At the same time, Parliament carried
out an extensive revision of the Canada Shipping Act, 14 which also
repealed the shipping legislation of the United Kingdom that was
previously in force in Canada. As with the preceding legislation,
this Act was not a comprehensive code of admiralty law.
The next significant step in the development of federal courts
jurisdiction in admiralty matters was the adoption of the present
Federal Court Act i5 in 1970. This Act defines the admiralty
jurisdiction of the Federal Court as extending to "all cases in which
a claim for relief is made or a remedy is sought under or by virtue of
Canadian maritime law or any other law of Canada relating to any
matter coming within the class of subject of navigation and
shipping, except to the extent that jurisdiction has been otherwise
specially assigned". 16 Like the 1934 Act, the Federal Court Act
continues with a list of many of the types of dispute in which the
Court has jurisdiction. 17 While this Act does not expressly confer
substantive rights in relation to admiralty, it does contain a general
provision continuing the maritime law existing prior to the coming
into force of the Act.' 8 Since this pre-existing law conferred
substantive rights, it can be argued that the Act confers such rights
through incorporation by reference.
III. The Constitutional Source of the Federal Court's Admiralty
Jurisdiction
Whatever special power the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act,
1890, may have conferred on the federal Parliament prior to 1934 to
establish admiralty courts, 19 it would seem that Parliament today
must rely on the provisions of the British North America Act for
such power. By virtue of the Statute of Westminister, 1931,20
Parliament received power to enact laws repugnant to English laws
such as the 1890 Act. While the exclusion of the British North
America Act from this new power generally preserved the division
14. S.C. 1934, c. 44. The present version of this Act is found in R.S.C. 1970, c.
S-9.
15. S.C. 1970-71-72, c.1, consolidated as R.S.C. 1970, 2nd Supp., c. 10
16. Id., s.22(1)
17. Id. s.22 (2) and (3)
18. Id., s.42
19. See note 5 for an outline of the argument whether special power was conferred
by the 1890 Act.
20. Supra, note 10, s.2.
572 The Dalhousie Law Journal
of powers under the Canadian constitution from subsequent
alteration by legislative bodies in Canada, the Colonial Courts of
Admiralty Act is not excluded from this new power. Indeed s.6 of
the Statute of Westminister expressly recognizes that the 1890 Act
is thereafter subject to overriding legislation within each of the
so-called Dominions.
In so far as the power to establish courts of admiralty was within
federal legislative authority by virtue of the 1890 Act, it would seem
to have been within federal power to amend the 1890 Act. By the
same token, it would seem that Parliament was able to repeal the
1890 Act in so far as it had federal application.
It should be noted that the Statute of Westminister itself rendered
the 1890 Act superfluous in one important respect. The 1890 Act
was designed to remove certain specific restraints on Canadian
legislative power that arose because of the colonial status of
Canada. The Statute of Westminister removed all such restraints.
By repealing the 1890 Act, Parliament removed any additional
source of federal power arising by virtue of that Act.21 Since 1934,
therefore, the British North America Act is the only available source
of federal power to establish courts of admiralty.
IV. The "Laws of Canada" Requirement
Under the British North America Act, federal power to establish
courts, apart from the Supreme Court of Canada, is limited to courts
which are "for the better Administration of the laws of Canada" .22
It was generally assumed until recently that "Laws of Canada"
meant, not only laws which had been enacted by Parliament or
under authority delegated by Parliament, but also any other laws
which could be altered under the legislative authority of Parliament.
In other words, the scope of federal power to create courts was
thought to be coextensive with the scope of federal legislative
power, without regard to whether that legislative power had actually
been exercised.
21. The Admiralty Act, supra, note 11, s.35. Technically, in so far as the 1890
Act may also have conferred power on provincial legislatures to establish courts of
admiralty, that power could not be removed by the federal repeal of the 1890 Act.
However, this has no practical significance since it is only by virtue of the general
division of powers under the B.N.A. Act that the 1890 Act may be interpreted as
conferring powers on the provincial legislatures, as well as on Parliament. To
determine the scope of provincial power vis-b-vis federal power under this
interpretation, one must look to the B.N.A. Act, and not to the 1890 Act.
22. B.N.A. Act, s.101
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In Quebec North Shore Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. 23 and
McNamara Construction (Western) Ltd. v. The Queen, 24 the
Supreme Court of Canada held that the federal power to create
courts can only be exercised if there is an existing body of federal
law to be administered by the court. In both cases a matter within
federal legislative jurisdiction was held to fall outside the
constitutional scope of federal court jurisdiction because the only
existing body of law applicable to the case was provincial statutory
or common law. Both cases recognized that there can be such a
thing as federal common law, so that federal court jurisdiction is not
limited to federal statutes and regulations. However, neither case
offered any test by which it can be determined what constitutes a
federal common law distinct from provincial common law for this
purpose.
As noted above, although there is extensive federal statute law
relevant to the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal court, there is no
comprehensive federal statutory code of admiralty law. Much of the
law to be applied derives from the special body of law developed for
admiralty matters in the High Court in the United Kingdom. Still
other parts of the law applicable to cases under the purported
admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal Court are based on the general
statutory and common or civil law of the provinces.
The possible constitutional limitation on the admiralty jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Court resulting from the Quebec North Shore
Paper and McNamara Construction has already occupied the
federal court with jurisdictional battles in at least six cases. The
results have been mixed. In The Queen v. Canadian Vickers Ltd., 25
the Trial Division found it had no jurisdiction over an action relating
to ship repairs where the action was in personam against the person
who contracted to make the repairs since the existing body of
admiralty law only dealt with actions in rem. As a result, the action
fell to be governed by the general provincial law of contracts, and
not by federal law.
On the other hand, in Sivaco Wire and Nail Co. v. Atlantic Lines
and Navigation Co., Inc., 26 the Trial Division concluded that a claim
for cargo damage was within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court.
Relying on the original provision in the Admiralty Act, 1891, that
23. Supra, note 2
24. Supra, note 2
25. Supra, note 1
26. Supra, note 1
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parties should enjoy all rights and remedies within the Exchequer
Court's admiralty jurisdiction, and on subsequent references to the
jurisdiction of the English High Court in the Canadian legislation
conferring admiralty jurisdiction on the Exchequer Court, the Court
decided that English maritime law had been incorporated by statute
into Canadian maritime law. In the Court's view, this created a
body of federal law for constitutional purposes.
In Intermunicipal Realty and Development Corporation v. Gore
Mutual Insurance Company,2 7 the Trial Division accepted
jurisdiction over a claim arising under a marine insurance policy.
However, it also held that it had no jurisdiction over an alternative
claim against the underwriters in the event the policy was not in
force. The Court relied on the current provision of s.42 of the
Federal Court Act, which continues in force Canadian maritime law
existing in 1971, as incorporating such law into federal law by
reference. The alternative claim involved only questions of agency,
which was not part of the maritime law.
In Associated Metals and Minerals Corp. v. The Ship "Evie
W", 28 the Federal Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction in a case
involving a breach of a contract of carriage. Instead of relying upon
the incorporation by reference as the Trial Division did in the Sivaco
and Intermunicipal Realty cases, the Court held the general body of
admiralty law constituted a body of federal common law which
constitutionally supported the grant of jurisdiction to a federal court.
In Santa Marina Shipping Co. S. A. v. Lunham & Moore Ltd., 29
the Trial Division found it had jurisdiction over an alleged breach of
a charter-party. The Court ruled that the clause in s.22(2) (i) of the
Federal Court Act conferring jurisdiction over charter-parties
incorporated the relevant substantive law, providing federal
statutory law upon which federal court jurisdiction could be
constitutionally based.
In Benson Bros. Shipbuilding Co. (1960) Ltd. v. Mark Fishing
Co. Ltd., 30 the Federal Court of Appeal held that it had jurisdiction
in an action by a shipbuilder against a shipowner for the balance
owing under the shipbuilding contract. This time the Court of
Appeal held that s.42 of the Federal Court Act made the relevant
body of maritime law into federal law.
27. Supra, note 1
28. Supra, note 1
29. Supra, note 1
30. Supra, note 1
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Before analysing the constitutional problem, it should be noted
that some of these cases raise an important practical defect in the
administration of justice which the constitutional issue may create.
Both the Canadian Vickers and Benson Bros. cases involved
disputes arising out of construction work on a ship. The claim by the
shipowner in Canadian Vickers was held to be outside federal
jurisdiction while the claim by the shipbuilder in Benson Bros. was
held to be within such jurisdiction. As actually occurred in Benson
Bros., such cases may often involve a counterclaim. While the
shipowner's counterclaim in that case was dismissed on its merits,
properly it would seem that the Court ought to have dismissed the
claim for lack of jurisdiction.
Similarly the Intermunicipal Realty case involved alternative
claims against insurers and underwriters which would customarily
be disposed of in a single action. However, it appears that two
separate actions in two separate courts may be necessary to settle
such disputes in the marine context.
Such potential duplication of legal proceedings seems a needless
burden on litigants. While the federal government has moved in the
direction of encouraging such duplication by the jurisdiction given
the Federal Court in 1971, the Supreme Court's definition of what
constitute "Laws of Canada" promises to compound the difficulty.
The constitutional problem posed by the Quebec North Shore
Paper and McNamara Construction cases as to the validity of the
Federal Court's admiralty jurisdiction revolves around the concept
of federal common law as a possible basis for the jurisdiction of the
federal courts in Canada. If an existing body of federal law is
necessary before a federal court can be established, it is difficult to
see how a federal common law could normally ever come into
being. Common law is judge-made law so that a federal court
administering common law is necessary to develop a federal
common law. But until the law is developed, constitutional power
to establish a federal court administering common law would be
lacking.
This dilemma may have been solved in the case of the admiralty
jurisdiction of the Federal Court by the historical development of
admiralty jurisdiction under the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act,
1890.31 By authorizing the creation of a federal admiralty court
independently of the British North America Act, the 1890 Act
31. Supra, note 5
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provided the mechanism by which a federal common law of
admiralty was developed. After that body of law had been
developed, as it was before the repeal of the 1890 Act for Canadian
purposes, arguably it was sufficient to support an exercise of the
federal power to establish courts under the British North America
Act.
32
One difficulty with this approach is that it leaves open to question
the validity of further judicial development of admiralty law by
federal courts after the 1890 Act was repealed for Canadian
purposes in 1934. The courts might avoid this problem by relying
on the analytical sleight of hand implicit in the concept that the
judges discover the common law, rather than make it. However,
there would seem to be some difficulty in rationalizing how it is that
the courts can discover a federal common law in this context and yet
cannot do so generally on matters within federal legislative
jurisdiction. The rejection of the discovery concept of the common
law seems implicit in the holding that the "Laws of Canada" are
not coextensive with the legislative jurisdiction of Parliament.
An alternative basis for supporting the admiralty jurisdiction of
the Federal Court under the rule in the Quebec North Shore Paper
and McNamara Construction cases is that the relevant common law
has been incorporated by reference into federal law through s.42 of
the Federal Court Act. The Quebec North Shore Paper case appears
to allow for this when it indicates that provincial laws can be "made
laws of Canada by adoption or enactment". 33 The decisions in the
Sivaco, Intermunicipal Reality, Santa Marina and Benson Bros.
cases explicitly adopt this approach.
A distinction should be drawn between Sivaco and Santa Marina
cases which base incorporation by reference on the sections granting
32. This may apply even if, as hypothesized in note 5, supra, the 1890 Act did not
constitutionally support the conferral of general admiralty jurisdiction on the
federal Exchequer Court. Whether or not that jurisdiction might have been
successfully challenged on constitutional grounds, it operated for over 40 years and
must be presumed valid until ruled otherwise. Therefore, the cases decided during
that period are res judicata and constitute a body of precedents which are uniform
for all of Canada and which are at least persuasive as to the substantive content of
the law of admiralty for Canada. The question as to whether this body of decisions
is law is similar to the question of whether statutes passed by a legislature would be
law if it were found after a lapse of an extended period of time that the legislature
was not validly constituted. In both cases, it is submitted that the interest of society
in stability of the law demands that the laws themselves be recognized as effective
and only the continued functioning of the invalidly constituted body is affected.
33. Supra, note 2, at71 D.L.R. (3d) 119
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the Federal Court specified areas of jurisdiction and the
Intermunicipal Realty and Benson Bros. cases which base
incorporation by reference on section 42 of the Federal Court Act.
To base incorporation by reference on the jurisdictional clauses
involves pulling the constitutional basis of federal court jurisdiction
up by its own bootstraps. On this reasoning any grant of jurisdiction
in an area of potential federal legislation should be valid since the
grant of jurisdiction would incorporate the relevant substantive law
into federal law. However, this seems to be precisely what the
Supreme Court ruled against in the Quebec North Shore Paper and
McNamara Construction cases.
Reliance on s.42 of the Federal Court Act avoids the problem
since that section is independent of the grant of jurisdiction to the
Federal Court and could be construed as an actual enactment of
substantive law through incorporation by reference. The difficulty
with reliance on s.42 is that, on its face, it is not an incorporation by
reference. It reads simply as a saving clause against any implied
alteration of existing substantive law by the Federal Court Act.
Apart from the question of interpreting s.42, one also hesitates to
accept the proposition that incorporation by reference is sufficient to
make common law into federal law since this would reduce the
"Laws of Canada" requirement envisaged by the Supreme Court in
the Quebec North Shore Paper and McNamara Construction cases
to a mere formality. It is necessary to ask whether the Supreme
Court would have taken the trouble to impose a purely formal
limitation on the scope of federal power in this area.
Although the Supreme Court does not articulate a policy
underlying its decision in these two cases, it does seem to be
concerned with the prospect of federal courts having to develop a
common law of Canada in order to exercise the new federal court
jurisdiction conferred by the Federal Court Act. It must be
remembered that, in its origin, the term "common law" referred to
the judge-made uniform law of England which was developed by
the Royal Courts to displace local customary law. The term has
since come to be more commonly used to refer generally to
non-statutory law, and in that sense includes, rather than excludes,
local customary law. However, it is still a central theme of the
common law that it is, or ought to be, one uniform body of law.
The development of a common law of Canada, in the sense of a
comprehensive body of non-statutory law on matters within federal
legislative jurisdiction, is a monumental task to impose upon the
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federal courts. The content of such a law is complicated not merely
by the existence of ten separate provincial legal systems, but
especially by the existence of two different legal traditions - the
English common law and the civil law of Quebec. In the course of
developing a federal common law through a federal court system,
Canada would constitute a single legal system. In this context, the
federal courts would face constant problems in reconciling the
existing diversity of law and the federal character of Canada with
the natural tendency and policy considerations in favour of
uniformity in the judge-made law of a single legal system.
It seems highly likely that the policy underlying the Supreme
Court's decisions in the Quebec North Shore Paper and McNamara
Construction cases is a view that it is more appropriate for
Parliament to undertake this delicate law-making task than it is for
the courts. If Parliament decides to discharge the task by referential
legislation, the judicial dilemma is solved since the existing diversity
has been selected by Parliament as the federal law. Even though the
difference between the presence of such referential legislation and
the absence thereof appears to be merely formal, an important
distinction between the role of the legislature and the role of the
courts is maintained by at least forcing Parliament to consider the
question.
It may be noted that, under this analysis, the constitutional
limitation recognized in the Quebec North Shore Paper and
MacNamara Construction cases probably does not prevent federal
courts from filling in gaps in existing bodies of federal law since
such interstitial law-making is a normal judicial task. On this basis,
the federal courts can probably elaborate on the law of admiralty
established under the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, even
if the referential provision in s.42 of the Federal Courts Act is not
sufficient to create a federal law. However, federal court entry into
new areas would not seem supportable except on the basis of the
referential provision bringing such areas into the domain of federal
law.
While the view that the federal law requirement is a purely formal
requirement that can be satisfied by a wide-ranging referential
provision, such as s.42 of the Federal Court Act, is a rationally
justifiable position, it remains to be seen whether this view will
actually be accepted by the Supreme Court.
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V. The Intraprovincial Shipping Limitation
Since many provinces in Canada have more than one port, there is
considerable scope for the carrying on of completely intraprovincial
shipping operations. Since such operations would frequently use the
same waters as interprovincial and international shipping opera-
tions, it would seem highly desirable that all shipping operations
should be subject to the same admiralty law and judicial
jurisdiction.
Federal legislative jurisdiction over admiralty must derive from
Parliament's powers in relation to "Navigation and Shipping" 34
and "Lines of Steam or other Ships . ..connecting the Province
with any other or others of the Provinces, or extending beyond the
Limits of the Province; [and] Lines of Steam Ships between the
Province and any British or Foreign Country". 35 The language of
the power relating to lines of ships is obviously limited to
interprovincial and international operations. Any federal power over
admiralty in relation to intraprovincial shipping, therefore, must
derive from the "Navigation and Shipping" power.
In Agence Maritime Inc. v. Conseil Canadien des Relations
Ouvrikres36 the Supreme Court of Canada indicated that the
"Navigation and Shipping" power should be given a restrictive
interpretation in line with the power relating to lines of ships.
Otherwise, the "Navigation and Shipping" power would render
meaningless the division of power between the federal government
and the provinces in relation to lines of ships. Specifically, the
Court held that the Canada Labour Relations Board had no
jurisdiction over an intraprovincial shipping operation.
The Court did recognize that there might be some matters of
"Navigation and Shipping" in relation to which federal legislation
could cover both intraprovincial shipping on the one hand and
interprovincial and international shipping on the other.3 7 By
excluding labour relations from such matters, however, the decision
gives grounds for serious doubt as to whether many matters
commonly assumed under admiralty law fall within the federal
"Navigation and Shipping" power.
34. B.N.A. Act, s.91(10)
35. B.N.A. Act, s.92(10) (a) and (b), which are federal powers by virtue of
s.91(29)
36. Supra, note 4. See also the recent analysis and application of this decision in
Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers v. Finlay
Navigation Ltd. (1978), 78 C.L.L.C. 16, 143 (Can. L. R. B.)
37. Supra, note 4, at 12 D.L.R. (3d) 729.
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Labour relations generally has been excluded from federal power
on the basis that it is a matter of "Property and Civil Rights in the
Province" .38 Federal legislation is allowed, as is federal legislation
over property and civil rights generally, in the case of specific
activities which are specially subject to federal power. In the area of
shipping, Validity and Applicability of the Industrial Relations and
Disputes Investigations Act 3 9 expressly recognized federal labour
relations jurisdiction.
If federal labour relations jurisdiction over shipping is restricted
to interprovincial and international shipping, as distinguished from
intraprovincial shipping, then federal power generally over property
and civil rights in relation to shipping would seem similarly limited.
Apart from the shipping context, a large part of the law of admiralty
would seem to involve property and civil rights. On the basis of the
Agence Maritime case, it would appear that the shipping context
cannot be a basis for federal power in the case of intraprovincial
shipping.
It might be contended that labour relations is a special case where
the courts have been particularly zealous to protect provincial
jurisdiction. Moreover, it might be thought that labour relations is
not really closely associated with regulation of shipping, so that the
courts would have little difficulty giving a different constitutional
classification to admiralty law.
An examination of the Canada Shipping Act, 40 however,
demonstrates that Parliament at least sees labour relations as a
fundamentally important aspect of shipping. Parts III and IV of that
Act constitute an extensive statutory codification of terms and
conditions of employment. If the courts are prepared in the face of
this to hold that the labour relations of intraprovincial shipping
operations are outside the "Navigation and Shipping" power, a
great many other parts of admiralty law may be similarly excluded.
Under this approach, federal admiralty law and federal court
jurisdiction would extend only to interprovincial and international
shipping. 41 Intraprovincial shipping would be subject to provincial
law and therefore within provincial court jurisdiction. Some federal
38. B.N.A. Act, s.92(13). See Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925]
A.C. 396; [1925] 2 D.L.R. 5; [1925] 1 W.W.R. 785 (P.C.)
39. [1955] S.C.R. 529; [1955] 3 D.L.R. 721
40. Supra, note 14
41. This assumes, in relation to federal court jurisdiction, that the federal law
requirement is met.
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admiralty law might continue to apply to intraprovincial shipping
within what the Supreme Court in the Agence Maritime case refers
to as the "realm of shipping". 42 It could take some time and a
considerable amount of litigation before the boundaries of this realm
are settled.
If this approach is followed, a lot of what has seemed long settled
in relation to admiralty law in Canada could be open for
reexamination, particularly since the constitutionality of such law
seems not to have yet been clearly addressed. While it is difficult to
rationally distinguish the position with respect to labour relations
from that with respect to property and civil rights generally, it seems
probable that in deciding the Agence Maritime case the Supreme
Court was operating under a particular mind set in respect to labour
relations. The courts have assigned labour relations to the provinces
almost as if it were a separate head of power, and not merely a
matter of property and civil rights. Out of this general provincial
jurisdiction has been carved a special, limited enclave of federal
labour relations jurisdiction in relation to matters such as federal
works and undertakings.
This mind set has been encouraged by the fact that, ever since the
Privy Council ruled that federal labour relations legislation of
general application was unconstitutional in Toronto Electric
Commissioners v. Snider,43 federal legislation has contained an
application provision corresponding roughly to what is thought to be
the constitutional language supporting federal legislation of limited
scope. 44 As a result, there has not been the same opportunity for the
courts to recognize a buffer zone of activity which was not clearly
covered by either federal or provincial legislation as has existed in
other areas of property and civil rights involving federal works and
undertakings. The existence of such a buffer zone in other areas has
allowed the aspect doctrine to develop and bring into play
effectively overlapping powers. This phenomena has not occurred
in respect to labour relations.
Under the influence of this mind set, the Supreme Court may not
even have realized that what it was saying with respect to labour
relations was logically applicable to property and civil rights
42. Supra, note 4, at 12 D.L.R. (3d) 729
43. Supra, note 38
44. The present provision is found is ss.2 and 108 of the Canada Labour Code,
R.S.C. 1979, c. L-1, as am. by S.C. 1972, c. 18
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generally. It is particularly doubtful if they thought of the possible
implications in relation to the law of admiralty.
In order to support the application of federal admiralty law to
intraprovincial shipping, the courts will have to recognize a wider
scope to the "Navigation and Shipping" power than is indicated by
the Agence Maritime case. This could be done in either of two
ways.
First, it might be argued that the works and undertakings power is
narrower in scope than the view taken in Agence Maritime would
indicate. That case takes the view that the labour relations, and by
inference the property and civil rights generally, of a work or
undertaking is part of the power over the undertaking. This power is
distributed according to whether the work or undertaking is
intraprovincial on the one hand or interprovincial or international on
the other hand. An alternative view is that such matters are
distributed between "Property and Civil Rights" on the one hand
and "Navigation and Shipping" on the other hand, and that the
works and undertakings power has a more limited connotation. On
this view, there is little reason to narrowly construe the shipping
power as the Agence Maritime case does. From this, one can
proceed to the position that property and civil rights, including
labour relations, in relation to all shipping is a federal matter. The
problem with this approach is that, while it would support federal
admiralty law, it would wipe out much federal legislation over other
works and undertakings, such as national railways, where there is
no general federal power corresponding to "Navigation and
Shipping".
The second and preferable possibility is a recognition that
"Navigation and Shipping" is a purely separate federal power from
federal works and undertakings. As such, it is quite capable of
supporting legislation that would otherwise be characterized as
property and civil rights legislation. The fact that similar legislation
might be supportable in so far as interprovincial and international
shipping is concerned under the federal works and undertakings
power is irrelevant. If some matters can have a double aspect which
permits them to be brought under both federal and provincial heads
of power, then surely matters can have a double aspect bringing
them under two different heads of federal power.
If the courts adhere to the logic of the Agence Maritime case, it
would be possible for the federal government to correct the
commercial inconvenience this would produce by a declaration that
Constitutional Limitations 583
vessels engaged in intraprovincial shipping are works for the
general advantage of Canada. 45 Such a declaration would bring the
property and civil rights of any undertaking conducted in connection
with the work under federal power.4 6 While strong provincial
opposition to such declarations now makes further use of this power
politically problematic, it is probable that even today such a
declaration would be an acceptable method of filling a constitutional
gap to support a well-established federal policy in the area of
transportation.
The intraprovincial shipping limitation poses a serious question
as to the validity of federal admiralty law and federal court
jurisdiction that appears not yet to have been recognized. The
possibility exists that this may become the basis for future
consitutional litigation which could leave large gaps in the existing
admiralty law system unless the Supreme Court either reverses its
limited intrepretation of the "Navigation and Shipping" power or
the federal government exercises its declaratory power to fill the
consititutional gap of intraprovincial shipping.
VI. Conclusion
The constitutionality of federal admiralty law and court jurisdiction
is a relatively unexplored field-. The Supreme Court's recent
elaboration of the "Laws of Canada" requirement has started a
flurry of constitutional litigation which may open up this field to
much new exploration. If that happens, a far more fundamental
question is likely to be posed before long, namely, just what is the
constitutional basis for the present regime of admiralty law in
Canada.
The "Navigation and Shipping" power would seem to be most
promising footing for general federal jurisdiction in admiralty. If the
Supreme Court follows the trail it has set out in the closely
analogous labour relations context, however, it is the distribution of
power over works and undertakings that will largely determine the
scope of federal and legislative power and court jurisdiction over
admiralty.
45. See B.N.A. Act, s.92(10) (c)
46. See The Queen v. Thumlert (1959), 20 D.L.R. (2d) 335; 28 W.W.R. 481
(Alta. C. A.); Chamney v. The Queen, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 151; 40 D.L.R. (3d) 146;
[1974] 1 W.W.R. 493
